



# **COUNTER TERROR GUIDANCE FOR EVENT ORGANISERS**

**Version 1  
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## **AIM OF THIS DOCUMENT**

The aim of this document is to provide advice to event organisers on a range of counter terrorism considerations that they may wish to include in their event management plans.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Terrorist attacks in the UK are a real and serious danger. Terrorists continue to target crowded places largely because they are usually locations with limited protective security measures and therefore afford the potential for mass fatalities and casualties. Terrorism also includes threats or hoaxes designed to frighten and intimidate.

In the case of bomb threats, or the planting of improvised explosive devices, the activities of extremist campaigners or malicious hoaxers are designed to damage the reputation of an organisation, intimidate, disrupt, cause economic damage and in some circumstances cause injury or loss of life. There are good business reasons for planning to avoid all of these possibilities or at least to minimise their consequences. There are also obligations on everyone (employer and employee alike) to play their part in protecting themselves and others.

## HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE

Hostile reconnaissance, the term given to the information gathering phase by those individuals or groups with malicious intent, it is a vital component of the attack planning process.

Security of the event should be focussed in the following manner: to **deny** the hostile the opportunity to gain information, to **detect** them when they are conducting their reconnaissance and to **deter** them by promoting failure through messaging and physical demonstration of the effective security.

### Deny

All members of staff should exercise caution as to what information is made available on public websites and social media. Whilst general site plans for an event may be an essential part of attracting visitors care should be taken that the plans are not too specific and that they would not provide information about location/timings of likely terrorist targets.

### Detect

All members of staff, stewards and security personnel should remain vigilant and aware of the fact that hostiles may act in a manner and with a different mind-set to the normal event visitor. They know that they are at the event for malicious reasons and may be behaving in a way that is out of the norm, thereby making them more anxious and paranoid and potentially more susceptible to detection.

Event organisers should proactively use on-site CCTV if available to monitor the crowd at all times in an attempt to identify and detect potential threats.

### Deter

Deterrence is a vital component of disrupting hostile reconnaissance.

Press media and social media will be used to reassure the public that security is a prime concern of the organisers and all members of staff should be aware that questions relating to possible attacks are likely in all contact/interviews with the media. All promotion of security capability **MUST** be truthful. If it isn't then, if the deceit is uncovered, all security claims may be discredited.

## Identifying Suspicious Behaviour

Remember to focus on behaviour not appearance

### On foot

- Loitering in restricted or public areas
- Paying significant interest to: entrances, exits, CCTV or security staff, taking photos
- Concealing face / identity
- Using disguises (PPE, official looking fluorescent clothing or lanyards for example)
- Asking unusual or security related questions
- Avoiding security staff
- Activity inconsistent with the nature of the building or area

### From a vehicle

- Vehicles parked out of place
- Vehicles retracing the same route
- Trust your instincts, if you see anything suspicious take action

## **Reporting of Suspicious behaviour**

When reporting suspicious behaviour the acronym SALUTED should be used to ensure all information required is available

S – Situation - who or what is suspicious?

A – Activity - what is happening?

L – Location - where was this?

U – Unit - who made the observation?

T – Time - when was this?

E – Equipment - was anything used to record the behaviour?

D – Description - of person/vehicle involved

## **Dealing with Hostile Reconnaissance/Suspicious Person**

If a suspicious person is reported by a member of the public or seen by staff then a member of the Security team should be deployed immediately, where possible the suspicious person should be kept under surveillance by a staff member until a member of the security team arrives. The person reporting should give a full description of the individual (including gender, age, ethnic code, dress and any bags carried etc) they should also give an accurate location of the individual and the reasons why the person is thought to be suspicious/hostile.

The security officer will only approach the suspect person if they or their management team deem that is safe to do so. However, in most instances the best way to deter hostile reconnaissance is to approach the individual in a friendly, non-confrontational, manner and enquire what they are doing by simply asking “Can I help you?”. Simply the act of letting the individual know that they have been identified may be enough to deter. We call this “The Power of Hello”.

Remember that you cannot detain that person or prevent them from leaving if they decline to answer. You also cannot seize cameras or phones.

If the member of security has concerns about the individual then the Security Manager should consider informing the Police.

## **A suspicious behaviours reporting form is at Appendix A**

## **BOMB THREATS AND IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES**

### **Bomb Threat**

Most bomb threats are usually made over the phone. The overwhelming majority are hoaxes, often the work of malicious pranksters, although terrorists also make hoax calls. However, until shown to be otherwise, all bomb threats should be treated as if they are genuine and the correct procedures followed.

**A hoax call is a crime and, no matter how ridiculous or unconvincing should be reported to the police.**

Calls from terrorists and extremists fall into two kinds:

1. Bomb threats when none has actually been planted. These hoaxes may not be merely malicious but designed to disrupt, to test reactions or to divert attention;
2. Bomb threats warning of a genuine device. These may be attempts to avoid casualties, but they also enable the terrorist to blame others if there are casualties.

Even genuine threats are frequently inaccurate with regard to where and when a bomb might explode. Staff receiving a bomb threat may not always be those trained and prepared for it, namely temporary reception or office personnel, however, the member of staff receiving such a call should attempt to assess a threat's accuracy, truth or origin and form their own impression of the caller. The member of staff receiving a call may be temporarily in a state of shock at the threat, which will be the closest that many people ever come to acts of terrorism. Despite this the member of staff should attempt to pass on a threat promptly, in as much detail as possible, to those tasked with deciding what action to take. Staff should always remember to distinguish between calls referring to their own building and those warning of a bomb elsewhere.

Office and reception staff should understand their important role in recording and communicating any bomb threat.

### **Receipt of a call**

Such threats or hoaxes will probably be made over the telephone the following guidelines apply to whoever receives the call. As soon as it is clear that a caller is making a threat let him/her finish their message without interruption.

Make sure that you write the message down exactly as it is given and try to get some clues on the caller such as;

- Male or female, young or old.
- Was a code word used – if so what was it?
- Conditions which may be affecting the speech such as anger, drunkenness, excitement or incoherence.
- Peculiarities of speech such as accent (foreign?), stutter tone or pitch.
- Any noises in the background – traffic, machinery, music. If a response is required then keep it brief.

When the caller has given the message try to keep him/her in conversation and if possible ask where the device has been placed, at what time is it likely to explode, when was it placed and why etc. The more information that you can obtain from the caller the more help it will be in dealing with the incident.

## **A form “Actions to be taken on receipt of a bomb threat” is at Appendix B**

### **Actions for staff**

1. Stay calm and listen.
2. Try to obtain as much information as possible and ask the caller to be precise about the location and timing of the alleged bomb(s) or device(s). Ask the caller who they represent and if they are inclined to talk, keep them talking.
3. Note the number of the incoming call, if displayed, from the automatic number display (or use 1471 after the call has ended in case the callers number is recorded)
4. While the operator is listening to the call they should make notes for the coordinator or police and not leave their post unless directed to evacuate.
5. STAY CALM AT ALL TIMES

Once you have finished talking to the caller, inform the Event Manager as soon as possible. It will then become their responsibility to set up to command the incident as necessary.

### **Housekeeping**

Good housekeeping practice comes into its own against this sort of attack. Public and private areas should be kept as clear as possible, with rubbish regularly removed and boxes and equipment stored tidily and in their own recognised places. Regular users, as well as cleaning and maintenance staff, should be encouraged to know what is usually there so that they can spot the unusual.

### **Delivered Items**

By the very nature of the event it necessitates receiving a wide variety of deliveries.

Delivered items, which include letters, parcels, packages and anything delivered by post or courier, has been a commonly used terrorist device. Delivered items may be explosive or incendiary (the two most likely kinds), or chemical, biological or radiological (CBR). Anyone receiving a suspicious delivery is unlikely to know which type it is.

Delivered items come in a variety of shapes and sizes. Incendiary devices have been located in cigarette packets, tape cassettes, briefcases or sports bags. There can be no exact descriptions of what to expect.

The traditional postal device takes many forms, parcels, padded “jiffy bags”, or envelopes of any shape or size. They may be delivered by hand or via a courier as well as through the post.

### **Indicators to Suspicious Deliveries/Mail**

- It is unexpected or of unusual origin or from an unfamiliar sender. There is no return address or the address cannot be verified.
- It is poorly or inaccurately addressed.
- The address has been printed unevenly or in an unusual way. The writing is in an unfamiliar or unusual style.
- There are unusual postmarks or postage paid marks.
- It seems unusually heavy for its size.
- It is marked ‘personal’ or ‘confidential’.
- It is oddly shaped or lopsided.

- There is an unusual smell but be aware that homemade explosives might not smell of traditional almonds or marzipan and might smell otherwise
- Staining on the packaging or liquid leaks
- There is an additional inner envelope, and it is tightly taped or tied.
- It has possibly an unusual number of postage stamps (the sender will be unlikely to have access to company post franking systems)
- Markings to indicate the recipient should open the item in a particular way or at one end.

## **SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES OR BAGS**

Good housekeeping improves the ambience of an event and reduces the opportunity for placing suspicious items or bags and helps to deal with false alarms and hoaxes. Terrorists in particular have a long history of leaving hand carried devices, holdalls, packages and so on, in public places or places to which access is simple.

**If in any doubt leave any suspicious item in place, obtain assistance and do not touch the object.**

Staff are the most valuable asset and their protection is paramount. They are also one of the best sources of protection. Staff should know their own office, work environment and parking area intimately. All staff should keep a sharp lookout for unusual behaviour or items out of place and have the support of managers to report things and know that their reports will be taken seriously and recognised as a positive contribution to the business.

In a terrorist context staff should be particularly vigilant if they see anyone placing, rather than dropping, a packet or bag in an unusual place, or in a fairly inaccessible area out of sight. Devices will be carefully but not elaborately concealed.

It is highly likely that during your event you will encounter unattended bags, holdalls etc. many, if not all, of these will be items that have been accidentally lost or misplaced; however, in the current climate all should be treated as suspect until proved otherwise.

When dealing with an abandoned item the H.O.T. principles will be applied in order to assist in deciding whether the item should be regarded as suspicious and therefore the response would be upgraded.

### **HOT Principles**

Consider using the below when dealing with an unattended bag or item when there is no other information or intelligence to suggest that it is suspicious.

#### **H – Hidden**

Hidden deliberately? Has a deliberate attempt been made to hide the item from view? Is it in a place where accidental discovery is unlikely?

#### **O – Obvious**

Obviously suspicious (does it look like a bomb, are there batteries/wires showing etc)? Why has it been abandoned? Has it been found after a suspicious event or report of someone acting furtively?



## **T – Typical**

Typical of what you would expect to find at location. Lots of the crowd will have bags. Can anyone who knows the area well confirm its status?

Any report of an abandoned/unattended item should be dealt with by event control who will deploy a member of security response. Event Control should keep a full log of the response and outcome.

## **Action to be taken upon declaration of any suspicious item**

When dealing with **suspicious items** apply the 4 Cs protocol:

### **Confirm, Clear, Communicate and Control.**

**CONFIRM** whether or not the item exhibits recognisably suspicious characteristics.

### **CLEAR the immediate area**

- Do not touch it
- Take charge and move people away to a safe distance. Even for a small item such as a briefcase move at least 100m away from the item starting from the centre and moving out.
- Keep yourself and other people out of line of site of the item. It is a broad rule, but generally if you cannot see the item then you are better protected from it.
- Think about what you can hide behind. Pick something substantial and keep away from glass such as windows and skylights.
- Cordon off the area.

### **COMMUNICATE – Call 999**

- inform your control room and/or supervisor
- Do not use radios or mobile phones within 15 metres.
- **Remember:** If you think it's suspicious, say something

### **CONTROL access to the cordoned area**

Maintain control of the area; members of the public should not be able to approach the area until it is deemed safe, try and keep eyewitnesses on hand so they can tell police what they saw

### **DO NOT USE MOBILE PHONES OR TWO-WAY RADIOS IN THE CLEARED AREA OR WITHIN 15 METERS OF THE SUSPECT ITEM**

Please be vigilant at all times and keep a sharp look out for unusual behaviour or items out of place.

## SEARCHING PREMISES AND ZONED SEARCH PROCEDURES

A search may be initiated in response to a specific threat. Bombs and incendiary devices are disguised in many ways. Searchers do not have to be expert in explosive devices. They are looking for anything:

- That should not be there
- That cannot be accounted for
- That is out of place.

Upon receipt of a threat a search should be implemented immediately and the police should be informed. Whilst the search is being carried out the police will be checking for an assessment of the credibility of the threat.

Staff nominated to carry out a search do not need to have expertise in explosives or other types of device but they must be familiar with the place they are searching.

They are looking for any items that should not be there, that cannot be accounted for and items that are out of place.

Following receipt of a bomb threat the police will not normally search premises. They are not familiar with the premises and layout, and will not be aware of what should be there and what is out of place. They cannot therefore search as quickly and as thoroughly as staff that work there all the time. The objective is to make sure that the whole building or area is checked as quickly and effectively as possible. Ideally, searchers should search in pairs to ensure searching is systematic and thorough.

Areas which will be used as safe areas or evacuation assembly areas, together with those areas where the greater number of the public, visitors or staff are likely to be vulnerable should be searched first. Public areas to which anyone has easy access should also have priority. Car parks, service yards, the outside area and perimeter should not be overlooked.

The searcher who finds a suspicious item must not move or interfere with it in anyway but inform Event Control.

- Do not touch or move the item
- Move everyone away to a safe distance
- Prevent others from approaching
- Use hand held radios or mobile phones away from the immediate vicinity of a suspect item, remaining out of line of sight and behind hard cover
- Inform Event Control giving as much information as possible
- The person finding the device must remain on hand to brief the police on the exact location and description.

## **HOSTILE VEHICLE INCURSION**

Some recent terrorist attacks in the UK and mainland Europe have moved away from sophisticated attacks using explosive devices and now use more readily available everyday items, enabling an attack to be more spontaneous. A preferred weapon is now a motor vehicle.

The possibility of an attack using a motor vehicle at an event could be from a vehicle brought to the event by a hostile person, who then gains access to the public areas to perform their attack. A second, more spontaneous, option would be for a hostile to use a vehicle that is already on the site.

If you are considering the use of physical measures to prevent hostile vehicles entering the event you are strongly advised to contact police and ask for expert advice from a specialist officer such as a Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) or Counter Terrorism Security Co-ordinator (CT-SecCo).

## **HOSTILE PERSON INCURSION**

Recent terrorist attacks have also involved intent to do harm with firearms or bladed weapons. The procedures outlined earlier in this plan relating to identifying anyone acting suspiciously may deter potential attackers but, if an armed individual is reported, then the following procedures should apply.

- All personnel should be reminded of “Run, Hide, Tell”.
- Inform Police
- Inform Security staff
- Consider Dynamic Lockdown
- Inform medical provider in case of mass casualties
- Inform Stewards / Traffic Management contractors to expect arrival of emergency services

## **RUN, HIDE, TELL**

### **RUN**

- If there is a safe route, RUN, if not hide
- Insist others go with you
- Don't let them slow you down
- Leave your belongings behind

### **HIDE**

- If you can't run, HIDE
- Find solid/hard cover from gunfire
- Be aware of your exits
- Lock yourself in a room if you can
- Move away from the door
- Be very quiet, turn off your phone
- Barricade yourself in

### **TELL**

- Call the police when you are safe
- Give your location

- Describe the attacker(s) and what they are using/carrying
- Can you safely stop others from entering the area?

## **DYNAMIC LOCKDOWN PROCEDURE**

There may be circumstances where an event may have to implement a “lockdown” procedure.

Dynamic lockdown is the ability to quickly restrict access and egress to a site or building (or part of) through physical measures in response to a threat, either external or internal. The aim of lockdown is to prevent people moving into danger areas and preventing or frustrating the attackers accessing a site (or part of).

Due to the nature of the site it may not be possible to physically achieve complete lockdown.

Lockdown may also be implemented when there is no incident on the site, the incident may be nearby or information has been received that a threat is on its way to the site and lockdown is necessary to protect those already at the event.

## NATIONAL MOVE TO CRITICAL

Following a change of the threat level to CRITICAL there are a number of options you may wish to consider.

### Threat Level Definitions

There are five levels of threat which are defined below:

<b>CRITICAL</b>	<b>AN ATTACK IS EXPECTED IMMINENTLY</b>
<b>SEVERE</b>	<b>AN ATTACK IS HIGHLY LIKELY</b>
<b>SUBSTANTIAL</b>	<b>AN ATTACK IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY</b>
<b>MODERATE</b>	<b>AN ATTACK IS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LIKELY</b>
<b>LOW</b>	<b>AN ATTACK IS UNLIKELY</b>

Current threat levels and further information can be obtained from [www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels](http://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels).

There is no specific intelligence; the assessment is generic and does not identify any sector or detail of locations or timings. As a consequence of the change in threat level it is recommended that those responsible for security review their plans and operations. You may wish to consider some of the options listed below.

There are some simple, practical actions you can take immediately to help improve the security of your venue:

### Security officers' posture and activity

- **Proactive engagement and staff briefings.**

One of the most disruptive measures to counter terrorists and wider criminality is a security force that appears to be vigilant and proactively engages with the public. Terrorists and criminals do not want to be spoken to by any member of staff and will actively avoid engagement – this should be polite but professional. If they are spoken to it is likely to make them feel very uncomfortable and exposed. Staff briefings will enable your security officers to understand the importance of proactive engagement and they should be encouraged to do this where practical and reasonable to do so. For example, if security officers patrol to areas in a car (such as a car park), encourage them to get out of the car and engage with people, as simple as saying good morning.

- **Unpredictable security measures.**

Unpredictability results in uncertainty and erosion of confidence in the mind of the hostile who need this predictable security arrangement so that they can plan for likely success. Where practical and reasonable build in unpredictability for example, timings and types of assets and search regimes deployed at your site.

- **'Recruit' staff to be vigilant for and immediately report suspicious activity and items.**

Use existing staff communications such as shift briefings, intranet etc. to inform as to what suspicious activity may look like, to trust their instincts and report immediately to the security control room/police. In these communications convey how their reports will be taken seriously and investigated and where possible showcase where previous staff reporting has led to outcomes, both where there have been benign and security outcomes;

this helps promote confidence in reporting.

## **Staff Vigilance**

- Do **ALL** staff understand how to respond effectively to reports of suspicious activity, behaviour and items when reported by the public? Who they should report to internally and when to report to police using 999?
- Disrupting hostile reconnaissance: Ensure staff understand how to identify suspicious behaviour (Do you have a challenge culture?)
- Suspicious Items: Ensure staff understand how to respond to suspicious items. Do staff know the HOT principles?
- Where entry is restricted, check the visitors identification prior to allowing access to the site

## **Free Counter Terrorism Training**

Under the national Action Counters Terrorism (ACT) programme (previously known as Project Griffin and Argus) you and your staff can obtain free training in all the topics described in this document. The sessions can be via a Police or County Council trained expert to a group by means of a PowerPoint, film and talk presentation or via registered access to an E-Learning programme.

For further details email [ctsa@lincs.pnn.police.uk](mailto:ctsa@lincs.pnn.police.uk)



**APPENDIX A - SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOUR REPORTING FORM**

Inform your Security Manager and the incident must be reported via 101 or 999

Date:	Time:	Location:

**CCTV / OTHER IMAGES:**

Yes		No		No of persons involved:	
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**ACTIVITY – WHY IS THE BEHAVIOUR SUSPICIOUS?**

(photography, video, extended observation, accessed restricted area etc.)

**PERSON**

Description		
Gender	Ethnicity	Facial features
Clothes / Footwear	Build	Hair style/colour
Height approx	Identifying features (e.g. Tattoos/scars/facial hair, birthmarks, piercings etc.)	Speech/accent/wording/phases

Equipment carried (Camera/bag, etc.)	Seen before?	Mode of travel (on foot/tram/train/car etc)

### VEHICLE DETAILS

Vehicle vrm:	Colour:	Make / Model:
Further info: Stickers/damage/body kit, etc.		

Was the person challenged? (If so what was their response or comments)

Additional information:

## APPENDIX B - ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT

This checklist is designed to help staff deal with a telephoned bomb threat effectively and to record the necessary information

Protective Marking: Restricted when Completed

### ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT

- 1 Remain calm and talk to the caller
- 2 Note the caller's number if displayed on your phone
- 3 If the threat has been sent via email or social media see appropriate section below
- 4 If you are able to, record the call
- 5 Write down the exact wording of the threat:

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ASK THESE QUESTIONS AND RECORD ANSWERS AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE:

1. Where exactly is the bomb right now?
2. When is it going to explode?
3. What does it look like?
4. What does the bomb contain?
5. How will it be detonated?
6. Did you place the bomb? If not you, who did?
7. What is your name?
8. What is your address?
9. What is your telephone number?
10. Do you represent a group or are you acting alone?
11. Why have you placed the bomb?
Record time call completed:

**INFORM SECURITY OR COORDINATING MANAGER  
DIAL 999 AND INFORM POLICE**

Name and telephone number of person informed:                      Time informed:

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**This part should be completed once the caller has hung up and police/ building security/ coordinating manager have all been informed**

Date and time of call:                      Duration of call:                      The telephone number that received the call:

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**ABOUT THE CALLER:**

	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Nationality?</b>	<b>Age?</b>
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**THREAT LANGUAGE:**

<b>Well-spoken</b>	<b>Irrational</b>	<b>Taped</b>	<b>Foul</b>	<b>Incoherent</b>
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**CALLER'S VOICE:**

<b>Calm</b>	<b>Crying</b>	<b>Clearing throat</b>	<b>Angry</b>	<b>Nasal</b>
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<b>Slurred</b>	<b>Excited</b>	<b>Stutter</b>	<b>Disguised</b>	<b>Slow</b>	<b>Lisp</b>	<b>*Accent</b>
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<b>Rapid</b>	<b>Deep</b>	<b>Familiar</b>	<b>Laughter</b>	<b>Hoarse</b>	<b>Other (please specify)</b>	
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\*What accent?

If the voice sounded familiar, who did it sound like?

**BACKGROUND SOUNDS:**

	<b>Street noises</b>	<b>House noises</b>	<b>Animal noises</b>	<b>Crockery</b>	<b>Motor</b>
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<b>Clear</b>	<b>Voice</b>	<b>Static</b>	<b>PA system</b>	<b>Booth</b>	<b>Music</b>
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<b>Factory machinery</b>	<b>Office machinery</b>	<b>Other (please specify)</b>
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**Protective Marking: Restricted when Completed**

**REMARKS:**

**ADDITIONAL NOTES:**

Signature:

Print Name:

Date:

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE:**

Please see

[www.nactso.gov.uk](http://www.nactso.gov.uk)

[www.cpni.gov.uk](http://www.cpni.gov.uk)

[NPCC Stay Safe Guidance](#)

Know what to do and prepare yourself with CitizenAID: <https://www.citizenaid.org/citizenaid>

Action Counters Terrorism - ACT NOW: [gov.uk/ACT](http://gov.uk/ACT)